On the “uniform pricing puzzle” in recorded music

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Abstract

This paper proposes a possible explanation for uniform pricing in the recorded music industry, based on a pooling equilibrium across different quality types. We show that an ex ante ability to invest in the probability of success – which we identify with record companies’ A&R expenditures – makes such a pooling equilibrium more likely.

Keywords: Recorded music, Uniform prices

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Introduction

In the week of January 15 2013, Amazon.com listed a number of new CD releases for various artists including A$AP Rocky, Jason Castro, 2Cellos, Yo La Tengo and Free Energy. The likely popularity of these artists can be casually assessed by looking at the maximum number of views their assorted videos have received on Youtube – for these 5 artists it was, in early February 2013, 9.5m, 4.4m, 2.5m, 0.82m and 0.01m respectively. And yet all of these CD releases were priced at US$9.99.

It has been a long-standing puzzle why record companies appear to “leave money on the table” by not engaging in differentiated pricing across their new releases.¹ Most explanations of the phenomenon hinge on supposedly distinctive aspects of the demand side. Orbach (2004) suggests, in the context of movie theatre ticket pricing, that explanations of uniform pricing fall into five categories, three of which are, “(i) concerns that variable pricing would antagonize patrons; (ii) uncertainty surrounding the success of newly released movies; [and] (iii) concerns that prices would be interpreted as quality signals.”² In this paper we argue that four features of the industry combine to suggest another reason for the observation of uniform pricing: that \textit{ex ante} uninformed firms make initial investments that undermine subsequent incentives for a now-informed firm to signal its type and increase the likelihood of a pooling equilibrium across quality types wherein prices are the same for all qualities.

The first of the four relevant features of the industry is that, at least to a first approximation, the production costs of a high-quality good are much the same as those of a

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¹ Similar puzzles have been noted in the retail of online download music – see Shiller and Waldfogel (2011) for a comprehensive discussion of Apple iTunes pricing and an effort to measure the costs of uniform pricing – and in the movie industry. In the latter case it is the uniform pricing behavior of exhibitors – i.e. movie theatres – rather than producers that is the puzzle: see Orbach (2004) and Orbach and Einav (2007).
² The other two categories of explanation Orbach (2004) notes are the perceived costs of administering variable pricing and concerns that variable pricing would complicate the principal-agent relationships between exhibitors and distributors.
low-quality good. The notion of ‘quality’ is a slippery one in this context and we use it simply as a short-hand for popularity with consumers, so this point is simply that the *ex ante* production costs of a popular recording are essentially the same as those for one that is less successful *ex post*. This means the industry cannot be well characterized as one in which firms invest directly in the quality of a particular recording (and can potentially signal their types through that investment.) Second, word-of-mouth sales are very important for these experience goods. (Orbach (2004, p.357) cites one Hollywood commentator as remarking, “[i]f it doesn’t open, you’re dead” meaning that a movie that does not make an initial splash on its opening weekend will not generally succeed at the box office or in secondary markets.) Third, promotional expenditures – advertising, marketing and publicity (which we shall refer to in aggregate as ‘advertising’) – are very significant for record companies³ and this, combined with the importance of word-of-mouth sales, potentially serves a signaling role (as we explain below). Fourth, while producers may *ex ante* be unaware of the quality of their proposed productions, they can and do spend substantial sums on efforts to improve the *expected* quality.⁴

Putting these together, our argument is as follows. We consider a 3-period setting in which there is product development – A&R – in period zero and then two periods of product sales. Suppose a firm produces – and sells in the last two periods – either a low (*L*) or high quality (*H*) good at the same cost and with known *ex ante* probabilities. Consumers have a

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³ “The marketing and promotion of artists is one of the largest items of spending in a record company’s budget” writes the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI, 2012 p.23) and report that, “[i]n 2011, record companies are estimated to have invested US$4.5 billion worldwide in artists and repertoire (A&R) combined with marketing. This represented 26 per cent of industry revenues.” (IFPI, 2012 p.7.) Elberse and Ofèck (2007), in a Case Study of a U.S. record company, provide a proforma profit and loss statement for an ‘average’ superstar band (Exhibit 9a, p.25) and suggest that for production costs of a recording (distribution, manufacturing, royalties, copyright and so on) of $18.5m, marketing and promotion costs would be a further $6m.

⁴ In a record company it falls to the Artist and Repertoire (A&R) department to identify and nurture talent. IFPI (2012 p.9) estimates that, “record companies worldwide invested 16 per cent of their revenues in A&R activity in 2011.” In light of the numbers provided in footnote 3 this amounts to over US$2.7b.
higher willingness to pay for an $H$ good than for an $L$ one and, furthermore, word-of-mouth sales, which potentially depend on the size of first-period sales, are higher for an $H$ good than an $L$ one. Suppose that, once the product is developed, the firm realizes its type but that this is not directly observable to consumers until the good has been marketed. Thus we have asymmetric information for the first period of the good’s life, with word-of-mouth ensuring full information thereafter. In our model an $H$ firm cannot signal its type through prices, as this can be costlessly mimicked. Advertising to stimulate first-period demand is more attractive for an $H$ firm than an $L$ because of the greater spillover into second-period sales and we could observe a separating equilibrium in period 1 in which an $H$ firm’s advertising level is distorted upward in order to signal its type and each type is marketed at a different price.

Now consider the product development stage. Before the game above is played out a firm does not know the quality of the good it will produce but it can invest up front in increasing the probability that it will produce a high-quality good. We show that expected profits are convex in that probability for an uninformed firm so, depending on the costs of such an investment, it may choose optimally to undertake it. But this increases the likelihood of a pooling equilibrium in the following pricing game; that is, the pre-marketing investment stage makes uniform pricing more likely.

The next section of the paper makes this argument more formally and the following section illustrates it with a specific example. A final section concludes.

**Model**

Consider a record company that is producing a new recording. Suppose that it can be one of two types, $\theta_L$ or $\theta_H$, where the probability of the latter is $\rho$. While we shall refer to these types as indicating ‘quality’ wherein $\theta_L<\theta_H$, it should be understood that this refers to the
appeal of the type to consumers. The record company sets a price $p$ in period one and also chooses a level of advertising, $a$, at that point. The product is sold, potentially, for two periods. In the first period, consumers observe $a$ as well as the price charged for the good. On the basis of this, they form beliefs as to the probability that the good’s type is $H$. Let $\mu^0 = p$ denote the prior belief and $\mu(a,p) \in [0,1]$ denote the posterior belief that the good is of high quality.

**Period One:** There are $a$ consumers, each consumer getting surplus of $u = \theta_i - p$, where $\theta_i$ is the true type of the product and $p$ denotes the price charged for the good. A consumer is willing to pay $\mu(a,p)\theta_H + (1-\mu(a,p))\theta_L$ for the good. The cost of advertising for the firm, $C(a)$, is increasing and convex in $a$: $C' > 0$, $C'' > 0$.5

**Period Two:** A low-quality type (now revealed) faces no demand,6 a high-quality type faces $\beta a$ consumers each with $u = \theta_H - p_2$ for some $\beta < 1$ and $p_2$ chosen by the firm. It is clear that, given full information in period 2, $p_2 = \theta_H$ in equilibrium.

The profit of the firm will depend on its true type (an $H$ type selling for two periods), the consumers’ beliefs concerning the firm’s type and the level of advertising (which affects both period 1 and period 2 sales.) Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE): a set of strategies $p(\theta)$ and $a(\theta)$ for each firm type and beliefs for consumers $\mu(a,p)$ such that strategies are sequentially rational and beliefs are consistent, where possible. Following Milgrom and Roberts (1986) we also require that equilibria be immune to the sequential elimination of dominated strategies. Finally, let $\pi_i(a,p)$ denote the profits of a firm

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5 Monotonicity of $C(a)$ ensures that market size $a$ is perfectly inferable from observing $C$ and vice-versa. In what follows we shall on occasion, for convenience, refer to $a$ as the firm’s level of advertising, but it should be understood that this is for ease of exposition only.

6 This is simply a normalization for convenience: what is required is that second-period sales are lower for an $L$ type firm than for an $H$ type. We assume that consumers are willing to pay some price, $\theta_L$, in period 1 for a product known to be of low quality but that no consumers are willing to buy a known low-quality good in period 2 but $\theta_L$ can be set to zero.
of quality type \(i = L, H\) in a \(j\)-equilibrium for \(j = s, p\) (for separating and pooling) with advertising of \(a\) and a first-period price \(p\). So, for example, \(\pi_L^a(d^a, p^a) = d^a p^a - C(d^a)\) and \(\pi_H^a(d^a, p^a) = d^a p^a + \beta d^a \theta_H - C(d^a)\).

**Equilibria**

**Full information**

It is useful to start by considering the case of full information where a firm’s type is known to consumers. A \(\theta_L\) type will optimally choose \(p = \theta_L\) and so seeks to maximize \(\pi_L = a_L \theta_L - C(a_L)\) over \(a_L\). Denoting \(C'(a)\) as \(f(a)\), this implies \(a_L = a_L^* = f^{-1}(\theta_L)\) and so \(\pi_L^* = a_L^* \theta_L - C(a_L^*)\).

A \(\theta_H\) type will optimally choose \(p = p_2 = \theta_H\) and so seeks to maximize \(\pi_H = a_H \theta_H (1 + \beta) - C(a_H)\) over \(a_H\). This implies \(a_H = a_H^* = f^{-1}((1 + \beta) \theta_H)\) and so \(\pi_H^* = a_H^* \theta_H (1 + \beta) - C(a_H^*)\). Note that if we write \(\pi_H\) as \(a_H p_1 + \beta a_H p_2 - C(a_H)\) then our FOC for \(a_H\) is \(a_H = f^{-1}(p_1 + \beta p_2)\) so, because \(f' = C'' > 0\), an increase in \(p_1\) (or \(p_2\)) will mean a higher optimal level of advertising. Note, too, that the convexity of \(C(\cdot)\) in \(a\) and the fact that \(\theta_L < \theta_H < (1 + \beta) \theta_H\) imply that \(a_L^* < a_H^*\) and that both of these choices are unique maximisers.

**Characterization of separating equilibrium**

A separating equilibrium occurs if the firm’s type can be identified directly from its first-period choices. It is straightforward to demonstrate that an \(H\) type firm cannot signal its type through prices only\(^7\)\(^8\) so a separating equilibrium here will occur if \(a_L \neq a_H\). In any separating

\(^7\) For a given level of advertising, the demand curve is essentially vertical in this model, up to the relevant reservation price for consumers’ beliefs. Any potential separating equilibrium in which \(p_i \neq \theta_i\) for \(i = L, H\) must be strictly dominated by a choice of a higher price, as this has no consequence for sales volumes.
equilibrium an $L$ type firm must choose its full-information level of advertising, $a_L^*$ so the low-type firm’s problem is exactly that it faces under full information and
\[ \pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) = \Pi(\theta_L, \theta'' = \theta_L). \]

We turn, then, to characterizing the advertising behavior of an $H$ type firm. In choosing its level of advertising in a separating equilibrium, an $H$ type firm must distinguish itself from an $L$ type firm; that is, it must ensure that it is not in the interests of an $L$ type firm to mimic an $H$ type. Let $\Pi(\theta, \theta'')$ denote the profits of a firm of type $\theta$ mimicking a type $\theta''$.

Then:
\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi(\theta_L, \theta'' = \theta_L) &= a_L \theta_L - C(a_L) \\
\Pi(\theta_H, \theta'' = \theta_L) &= a_L \theta_L - C(a_L) + \beta a_L \theta_H
\end{align*}
\]

So we have two no-mimicking constraints:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{SSC}_L: \Pi(\theta_L, \theta'' = \theta_L) &\geq \Pi(\theta_L, \theta'' = \theta_H) \Rightarrow a_L \theta_L - C(a_L) \geq a_H \theta_H - C(a_H) \\
\text{SSC}_H: \Pi(\theta_H, \theta'' = \theta_H) &\geq \Pi(\theta_H, \theta'' = \theta_L) \Rightarrow a_H \theta_H - C(a_H) + \beta a_H \theta_H ; \geq a_L \theta_L - C(a_L) + \beta a_L \theta_H
\end{align*}
\]

8 A significant early contribution to the literature on advertising to signal quality is Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Our model differs from theirs in that (1) advertising in our model is not purely dissipative but serves also to increase the market size and (2) demand here, for given beliefs, is not a smoothly declining function of price. For any given level of advertising and belief of consumers, the profit function for an $H$ or an $L$ type is identical with respect to price, up to the relevant willingness to pay for that belief (i.e. $\theta_H$ or $\theta_L$). Consequently, higher prices cannot signal high quality in our model. Milgrom and Roberts do note (p. 811) that, in their model, if the optimal first-best price charged by an $H$ firm is the same as that charged by an $L$ firm taken for an $H$, “then all signaling is via advertising”. This is our result too: in our model these two prices both equal $\theta_H$. A more recent contribution is Zhao (2000) who argues that choosing advertising and prices to signal quality in a model where, like ours, advertising increases the size of the market, can lead to the use of lower advertising to signal high quality. This arises because, unlike Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and the current paper, he assumes lower costs for a lower-quality producer. Consequently, the margin from a higher price is greater for a low-quality producer than a high-quality one and the incentive to mimic a high-quality firm that advertises a lot is very great – if taken for a high-quality firm it can consequently charge a higher price. As in Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Zhao (2000) assumes that demand, for given beliefs, is a smoothly declining function of price. 9 This follows from $a_L^*$ being a unique maximiser. Thus $\pi_L(a_L^*, \mu = 0) < \pi_L(a_L, \mu = 0)$ $\forall a_L^*$. Note, too, that we will have $p = \theta_i$ for $i = L, H$ in any separating equilibrium: once revealed, neither type has an incentive to choose any price other than that which is optimal for its type.
Suppose, first, that an \( H \) type firm simply chooses its full information optimum, so that \( \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) = \pi(\theta_H, \theta'' = \theta_H) \) and suppose that, at these values, the SSC constraints are met. If the separating equilibrium is undistorted – an \( H \) type just chooses \( a \) equal to its full information level – then a pooling equilibrium must always be worse for the high-quality firm, as it has a lower first-period price. There can exist no pooling equilibrium in such a case and the informational aspects of the problem play no part.

So we restrict attention henceforth to the case where the separating equilibrium requires signaling by an \( H \) type firm. Any signaling equilibrium must involve a distorted level of advertising, say \( a_H^s > a_H^* \). This means that the SSC\(_L\) above holds exactly and solves implicitly for \( a_H^s \): \( \pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) = \pi_L(a_H^s, \theta_H) \) or \( C(a_H^*) - C(a_L^*) = (a_H^s \theta_H - a_L^* \theta_L) \). An \( L \) type gets profits of \( \pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) \) and an \( H \) type’s profits are \( \pi_H = \pi_H(a_H^s, \theta_H) \).

**Pooling equilibrium**

In a pooling equilibrium we observe a common level of advertising \( a^p \) for both types, the same market size in period one of \( a^p \) and a first-period price of \( p = (1 - \rho) \theta_L + \rho \theta_H \). In the second period an \( H \) type will still charge \( \theta_H \), clearly. So

\[
\pi_L^p = a^p p - C(a^p)
\]

10 Clearly SSC\(_H\) must be met here, as the full-information solution represents a global maximum for the \( H \) type firm: (a) \( \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) \geq \pi_H(a_L^*, \theta_H) \), because it must exceed \( \pi_H(a, \theta_H) \) for any feasible \( a \), and (b) \( \pi_H(a_L^*, \theta_H) \) must strictly exceed \( \pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) \) because \( \theta_L \) is a lower first-period price (for the same advertising and therefore sales.) So \( \pi_H(a_L^*, \theta_H) > \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) \) and SSC\(_H\) is met.

11 That is, SSC\(_L\) is violated at the full information point. So \( C(a_H^*) - C(a_L^*) < (a_H^* \theta_H - a_L^* \theta_L) \).

12 The sequential elimination of dominated strategies rules out any potential separating equilibria in which the high-quality firm signals more than it needs to: these can only arise if they are supported by beliefs that a low-quality type would play a dominated strategy. See Milgrom and Roberts (1986) for a more complete exposition.

13 The SSC\(_H\) is met here: \( \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) = \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) + \beta a_H \theta_H \) so, by SSC\(_L\), \( \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) = \pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) + a_H \beta \theta_H > \pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) + a_L \beta \theta_H \) because \( a_H > a_H > a_L^* \).
Maximizing pooling profits for an $H$ type firm over $d^p$ implies some optimal $d^p*$, denoted $d^p*$, where $d^p* = f^{-1}\{p + \beta \theta_H\}$. Thus

$$\pi_H' = d^p* \{p + \beta \theta_H\} - C(d^p*)$$

An $L$ type must choose the same level of advertising and price so:

$$\pi_L'(d^p*, p) = d^p* \{p + \beta \theta_H\} = \pi_H' - \beta \theta_H d^p*$$

If a pooling equilibrium is to prevail it must be the case that maximized profits for an $H$ type firm in the pooling equilibrium exceed the profits available when the firm credibly signals its type. That is, pooling can occur only if $\pi_H'(d^p*, p) - \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) \geq 0$ or

$$d^p* \{p + \beta \theta_H\} - C(d^p*) \geq a_H^* \theta_H (1 + \beta) - C(a_H^*)$$

Note that this condition is more likely to hold the higher is $\rho$ (as higher $\rho$ increases both $p$ and $d^p*$ and so, therefore, it increases $\pi_H'(d^p*, p)$).\(^{14,15}\)

Figure One presents a pictorial representation of these potential equilibria. The solid curves are isoprofits for a low type firm in a-$p$ space, the dashed curves are those for a high type.\(^{16}\) The heavier lines $a_i(p)$ for $i = L, H$ denote loci of optimal market size choices for each firm type, accurately perceived by consumers, for any value of $\rho$. From our earlier discussion these are upward-sloping and that for the high type lies above that for the low type.

\(^{14}\) Note that $a_H^*$ is defined by $\pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) = \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) = a_H^* \theta_H - C(a_H^*)$ which is unaffected by $\rho$. Also, $d^p* = f^{-1}\{p + \beta \theta_H\}$ so $d^p*/d\rho = f'\{p + \beta \theta_H\}/(\theta_H - \theta_L) > 0$ by the convexity of $C(\cdot)$. Of course, $a_H^*$ is chosen to maximize $\pi_H(d^p*, p)$, so the effect of any induced change in $d^p*$ on $\pi_H(d^p*, p)$ is second-order only.

\(^{15}\) As is commonly the case in these sorts of models, any pooling equilibria will not survive the imposition of refinements such as Cho and Kreps’ (1987) intuitive criterion.

\(^{16}\) Technically these isoprofits are not all continuous in the way they are illustrated here. For example, a firm that is perceived to be a low type can not charge a price greater than $\theta_L$. If it does so it will make no sales and so the appropriate isoprofit is then that associated with profits of $-C(a)$.\)
A pooling equilibrium here involves both types setting a price of $p$ and a market size of $a^p$.

Note that the high type firm chooses $a$ optimally in this outcome given the pooling price, but the low type advertises more than it would optimally at $a^p$ in order to make it indistinguishable to consumers from a high type. It is, of course, better off in this outcome, earning profits of $\pi_L^p$, than if its type were revealed, in which case it would earn only $\pi_L^*$. Turning to separating equilibria, all points in the cross-hatched area are potentially separating PBE: in all of them a low type is better off being revealed and earning $\pi_L^*$ but a high type does better than if it were taken to be a low type. However, our restriction on beliefs that consumers attach zero probability to a firm playing a dominated strategy rules out all of these outcomes except that which is best for the high type: where the low type chooses $\theta_L$ and $a_L^*$ for profits of $\pi_L^*$ and the high type chooses $\theta_H$ and $a_H^s$ for profits of $\pi_H^s$.

Figure One: Pooling and separating equilibria
To see this, consider a high type firm choosing some particular $a_p$ combination in the interior of the cross-hatched area. This can be sustained as a PBE, with the low type choosing $\theta_L$ and $a_L^*$, if consumers believe that any deviation from that point that is profitable for a high type, say to one with the same market size but a higher price, would indicate a low type. With such beliefs – which are not ruled out by the PBE equilibrium concept alone – such a deviation would be unprofitable for the high type and the original conjectured equilibrium would stand. But such a deviation would be a dominated strategy for a low type firm, as it is worse off than if it stayed with $\theta_L$ and $a_L^*$. Accordingly, consumers should place zero probability on such a deviation coming from a low type; this implies it is from a high type, for whom it is profitable, and the original conjectured equilibrium fails.

**Initial stage**

Before a risk-neutral firm learns its own type, might it wish to invest in increasing $\rho$ to the point where a pooling equilibrium subsequently prevails? Note first that expected profits *ex ante* will depend on whether parameters lead to a separating or a pooling equilibrium. In the separating case we have $E\Pi^s = \rho \pi^s_H(a^s_H, \theta_H) + (1-\rho)\pi^s_L(a^s_L, \theta_L)$. With SSCL holding exactly, $\pi^s_L(a^s_L, \theta_L) = \pi_L(a^s_L, \theta_L) - \beta a_H \theta_H$ so expected profits *ex ante* are $E\Pi^s = \pi^s_H(a^s_H, \theta_H) - (1-\rho)\beta a_H \theta_H$. And if a pooling equilibrium were to prevail then expected profits *ex ante* would be $E\Pi^p = \rho \pi^p_H(a^p_H, \theta_H) + (1-\rho)\pi^p_L(a^p_L, \theta_L)$. We know that this will occur *ex post* only if $a^p_H \varphi + \rho a_L \theta_L - C(a^p_H) \geq a_H \theta_H(1+\beta) - C(a^s_H)$ and it is clear that this is violated at low $\rho$. Let the critical value of $\rho$ at which the *ex post* equilibrium switches from separating to pooling – be denoted $\rho^*$.

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17 This reasoning closely follows that of Milgrom and Roberts (1986) pp.804-5.
18 In the limit at $\rho=0$ there are only $L$ types and any equilibrium is trivially a separating equilibrium.
For $\rho < \rho^*$, as $\rho$ has no effect on either $\pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H)$ or $\pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L)$ (because both $a_L^*$ and $a_H^*$ are independent of $\rho$) so an increase in $\rho$ raises $\Pi^*$ only insofar as it shifts the weight across these two components onto the greater of the two, $\pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H)$, which exceeds $\pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L)$ by the $H$ type firm’s second-period profits, $\beta a_H^* \theta_H$. Hence, unsurprisingly:

$$\partial E \Pi^* / \partial \rho = \beta a_H^* \theta_H > 0$$

Note, particularly, that the slope of $E \Pi^*$ with respect to $\rho$ is constant.

Turning to pooling profits, for an $L$ type firm in a pooling equilibrium (i.e. for $\rho > \rho^*$) these must exceed the profits it would obtain from separating, by direct revealed profitability arguments. Certainly, then, for any $\rho > \rho^*$ it must be the case that $E \Pi^p > E \Pi^s$ (as the former is a convex combination of two elements that are each greater than those combined in the latter with the same weights) and, furthermore, $E \Pi^p$ must be increasing in $\rho$ more steeply than $E \Pi^s$ (as the former averages two values both themselves increasing in $\rho$.) As a result, for $\rho < \rho^*$, because the ex post equilibrium is a separating equilibrium, the ex ante expected profits are given by $E \Pi^s$ and for $\rho > \rho^*$, because the ex post equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium, the ex ante expected profits are given by $E \Pi^p$. Exactly at $\rho = \rho^*$ there must be a discrete jump in ex ante expected profits from $E \Pi^s$ to $E \Pi^p$ (a jump because $\pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) = \pi_H(a_H^*, \rho)$ at that point but $\pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) < \pi_L(a_L^*, \rho)$, so the weighted average of $\pi_H(a_H^*, \rho)$ and $\pi_L(a_L^*, \rho)$ must exceed the same-weighted average of $\pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H)$ and $\pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L)$.)

Suppose the cost of investing in $\rho$ takes the form $l + k(\rho - \rho^0)$ for some constant $k > 0$, some $\rho^0 \leq 1$ and assuming $\rho \geq \rho^0$, where $\rho^0 > 0$ denotes the ‘default’ value of $\rho$ – that value that will occur if the firm makes no ex ante investment. That is, suppose this cost function involves a constant marginal cost. Then only one of two outcomes can occur. Either the firm will make no ex ante investment in $\rho$: if the total cost of it exceeds the total benefit from an increase in $E \Pi$. On the other hand, if the total cost is less than the potential gain then the firm
will make some *ex ante* investment in \( \rho \) but, importantly, it will always invest beyond \( \rho^* \) (indeed, to the maximum feasible \( \rho = \bar{\rho} \)). That is, if \( \bar{\rho} \) is sufficiently close to one, the firm will invest sufficiently in \( \rho \) that a pooling equilibrium will prevail *ex post*. The reasons for this are, first, the discrete break in profits at \( \rho^* \) and, second, the fact that marginal profit gains are linear in \( \rho \) below \( \rho^* \).19

More generally, however, with an increasing and convex cost function for this investment we could in principle observe an interior equilibrium at any value of \( \rho \). Our claim is simply that the addition of this *ex ante* stage makes the pooling outcome more likely, in the sense described above, due to the convexity of *ex ante* expected profits in \( \rho \).

**A specific example**

Consider the model just discussed but with two adjustments: suppose that the advertising cost function takes the specific form \( C(a) = \frac{1}{2}ca^2 \) for some constant \( c \) and normalize the low quality \( \theta_H \) to zero. Now our full information solutions can be made explicit. An \( L \) type will seek to maximize \( \pi_L = a_L \theta_L - \frac{1}{2}c(a_L)^2 \) over \( a_L \) yielding \( a_L^* = \pi_L^* = 0 \). An \( H \) type will seek to maximize \( \pi_H = a_H \theta_H (1 + \beta) - \frac{1}{2}c(a_H)^2 \) over \( a_H \). This implies \( a_H^* = (1 + \beta)\theta_H / c \). As before, if we write \( \pi_H \) as \( a_H p_1 + \beta a_H p_2 - \frac{1}{2}c(a_H)^2 \) then our FOC for \( a_H \) is \( a_H = (p_1 + \beta p_2) / c \) so an increase in either \( p_1 \) or \( p_2 \) will mean a higher optimal level of advertising. Also, we can now see explicitly that \( a_L^* < a_H^* \) and that both of these choices are unique maximisers.

With respect to separating equilibria, we have:

19 To see this result, suppose that it is profitable to invest positively in some \( \rho \) where \( \rho \) exceeds \( \rho^0 \) but is less than \( \rho^* \). The MC of a small increase in \( \rho \) is then \( k \) and if this is less than the constant marginal benefit (\( \beta \theta_H / \theta_H \)) then it will pay to increase the investment beyond \( \rho^* \) (to \( \rho = \bar{\rho} \), in fact, given that the marginal profit gain discretely increases at \( \rho^* \)); if not, then it must raise profits to reduce the investment in \( \rho \) and, at \( \rho = \rho^0 \), to save the fixed investment cost \( I \).
\[ \Pi(\theta_L, \theta'' = \theta_L) = -\frac{1}{2}c(a_L)^2 \quad \Pi(\theta_L, \theta'' = \theta_H) = a_H \theta_H \frac{1}{2} c(a_H)^2 \]

\[ \Pi(\theta_H, \theta'' = \theta_L) = -\frac{1}{2}c(a_L)^2 + \beta a_H \theta_H \quad \Pi(\theta_H, \theta'' = \theta_H) = a_H \theta_H \frac{1}{2} c(a_H)^2 + \beta a_H \theta_H \]

And our no-mimicking constraints become:

SSC_L: (i) \( \frac{1}{2}c(a_H^2 - a_L^2) \geq (a_H \theta_H) \)

SSC_H: (ii) \( \frac{1}{2}c(a_H^2 - a_L^2) \leq (a_H \theta_H) + \beta \theta_H (a_H - a_L) \)

We can now be explicit about the parameter restriction that rules out an undistorted separating equilibrium. If \( \pi_H^s(a_H^s, \theta_H) = \pi_H^s(a_H^*, \theta_H) \) then \( \pi_H^s(a_H^s, \theta_H) = \frac{1}{2}(1+\beta)^2 \theta_H^2 c \) and \( \pi_L^s(a_L^*, \theta_L) = 0 \) and we require that, at these values, the SSC_L constraint is not met.\(^\text{20}\) That is, we assume that \( \frac{1}{2}c((a_H^*)^2 - (a_L^*)^2) \leq (a_H^* \theta_H) \) or, substituting in from above, \( (1+\beta) \leq 2 \).

Consequently, our restriction that \( \beta < 1 \) is sufficient to meet this condition.

So any signaling equilibrium must involve a distorted level of advertising, which means that the SSC_L above holds exactly and solves for \( a_H^s = 2 \theta_H / c \). An L type gets profits of \( \pi_L^s(a_L^*, \theta_L) = 0 \), an H type’s profits are \( \pi_H^s = \pi_H(a_H^s, \theta_H) = 2 \beta \theta_H^2 / c \) and it is easily verified that SSC_H is satisfied.

Turning to a pooling equilibrium, now \( p = \rho \theta_H \) and:

\[ \pi_L^p = c d^p \rho \theta_H \frac{1}{2} c(d^p)^2 = d^p \rho \theta_H \frac{1}{2} c(d^p)^2 \]

\[ \pi_H^p = c d^p \rho \theta_H \frac{1}{2} c(d^p)^2 + \beta d^p \theta_H = d^p (\rho + \beta) \theta_H \frac{1}{2} c(d^p)^2 \]

Maximizing an H type firm’s pooling profits over \( d^p \) implies \( d^p* = (\rho + \beta) \theta_H / c \). Thus \( \pi_H^p(d^p*, \rho) = (\rho + \beta)^2 \theta_H^2 / 2c \)

\(^\text{20}\) Again, SSC_H must be met here.
An L type must choose the same level of advertising and price so:

$$\pi_l'(a^*, p) = a^* \rho \theta H^{-1/2} c(a^*)^2 = (\rho + \beta)(\rho - \beta) \theta H^2 / 2c$$

Consequently, pooling will occur only if

$$\pi_H'(a^*, p) - \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) \geq 0$$

or

$$\theta H^2 / c \geq 2 \beta \theta H^2 / c$$

or

$$\rho \rho H^2 / c \geq 4 \beta$$

As noted earlier, this condition is more likely to hold the higher is $\rho$. Furthermore, it solves for the critical value $\rho^* = 2 \beta^{1/2} - \beta$: for $\rho$ below this the separating equilibrium prevails, for $\rho$ above it we observe a pooling equilibrium.

Rolling back to the initial stage of investment in $\rho$, we now have

$$E\Pi_s = \rho \pi_H(a_H^*, \theta_H) + (1-\rho) \pi_L(a_L^*, \theta_L) = 2 \rho \beta \theta H^2 / c$$

and

$$E\Pi_p = (\rho + \beta)(2 \rho \beta + \rho - \beta) \theta H^2 / 2c$$

From these we can see that $dE\Pi_s / d\rho = 2 \beta \theta H^2 / c$ which is a constant, as noted above, and that $dE\Pi_p / d\rho$

$$= \{\rho(2 \beta + 1) + \beta^2\} \theta H^2 / c.$$ The slope of $E\Pi_p$ with respect to $\rho$ exceeds that of $E\Pi_s$ when

$$\rho(2 \beta + 1) + \beta^2 > 2 \beta$$

i.e. $\rho > (2 - \beta) / (2 \beta + 1)$. It is straightforward to see that this occurs at a value of $\rho$ strictly less than $\rho^*$, reaffirming our earlier finding that the slope of $E\Pi_p$ with respect to changes in $\rho$ must exceed that of $E\Pi_s$ for all $\rho > \rho^*$.

In this case, then, we will observe ex ante expected (separating) profits when $\rho < \rho^* = 2 \beta^{1/2} - \beta$ and (pooling) profits when $\rho$ weakly exceeds $\rho^*$. But we can show that $E\Pi = E\Pi_p$ at a value of $\rho$ that is strictly less than $\rho^{*21}$, so $E\Pi|_{\rho^*} > E\Pi_p|_{\rho^*}$, as argued previously. So if the ex ante cost of investing in $\rho$ takes the form $I + kp$ for some positive constant $k$, and if $k > 2 \beta \theta H^2 / c$ then the firm will either make no ex ante investment in $\rho$ or will invest beyond $\rho^*$ to $\rho = \bar{\rho}$.

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21 Equating $E\Pi$ and $E\Pi_p$ solves for $\rho = (1 - \beta)^{1/2}(2 + \beta^{1/2})^3 / (1 + 2 \beta)$. But $\beta < 1$ so $\beta^2 < \beta < 1$ so $(2 + \beta^{1/2})^3 < 2$ hence $\rho^* < (3 - \beta)(1 + 2 \beta)$. This expression is less than $\rho^*$ if $\beta(3 - \beta)(1 + 2 \beta) < 3 \beta^2 < 4 \beta^2 - 2 \beta + 4 \beta^2 - 2 \beta^2$ or $0 < 2 \beta^{1/2} - 4 \beta + 4 \beta^{1/2} - \beta^2$ or $0 < 2 \beta^{1/2} + 4 \beta^{1/2} - 3 \beta$ or $4 \beta^2 > 4 \beta^2 - 2 \beta$. But $4 \beta^2 > 4 \beta^2$ and $2 > \beta^2$ so $\rho^* > \rho^*$. 

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Figure Two illustrates this case for $\theta_H=0.8$, $\beta=0.25$ and $c=0.2$, which imply that $\rho^*=0.75$. Expected separating profits are now $E\Pi^s=1.6\rho$ and expected pooling profits are $E\Pi^p=0.1(4\rho+1)(6\rho-1)$ so the slope of the former with respect to $\rho$ is constant at 1.6 and of the latter is $0.48\rho+0.2$: the latter is steeper than the former for any $\rho>7/24 \approx 0.292$. The weak convexity of overall expected profits in $\rho$ is clear. And $E\Pi^s=E\Pi^p$ at $\rho=0.6478$, which is indeed less than $\rho^*$.

![Figure Two: Profits against $\rho$](image)

Turning to the costs of making an investment in $\rho$, take the simple case where $l=0$ so the cost is just $k(\rho-\rho^0)$ for some constant $k$. As noted earlier we will now observe either $\rho=\rho^0$ or $\rho=\bar{\rho}$. Suppose $\rho^0$ occurs at some value of $\rho<\rho^*$ so the firm faces $E\Pi^p$ if it should make no up-front investment. The marginal gain from a small increase in $\rho$ is then $1.6-k$. Clearly if $k<1.6$ then $\rho$ should be increased and, as when $\rho$ reaches $\rho^*$ we observe a regime change and the firm now faces a marginal profit gain that is even greater, so $\rho$ should be increased to $\bar{\rho}$. 

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But this might occur even if $k>1.6$, because of the discrete increase in profits at $\rho^*$. The expected profits from raising $\rho$ above $\rho^*$ are $E\Pi^p = 0.1(4\rho+1)(6\rho-1)-k(\rho-\rho^0)$ while doing nothing yields $E\Pi^s = 1.6\rho^0$. It will then be profitable to invest to $\tilde{\rho}$ if $2.5-k(1-\rho^0)>1.6\rho^0$ or $k<2.5-1.6\rho^0/(1-\rho^0)$. This can hold for a wide range of parameters (e.g. if $\rho^0=0.5$ and $\tilde{\rho}=1$ then this will be satisfied for any $k<3.4$.)

Conclusion

In this paper we propose a possible explanation for uniform pricing by producers of recorded music, based on a pooling equilibrium prevailing in a model of different quality products, unobservable to consumers prior to consumption. We build a simple model of advertising that is not purely dissipative but also affects market size and two-period demand and we show that an ability to invest in the probability of success before it is realized – which we associate with record companies’ A&R expenditures – makes such a pooling equilibrium more likely. Our explanation contains elements of the factors cited in Orbach (2004) as possible reasons for the uniform pricing of movie theatre tickets, particularly uncertainty surrounding the success of newly released movies – an uncertainty that applies to firms in the first stage of our game and consumers in the second – and concerns that prices would be interpreted as quality signals.
References


